Popular Uprising: Eve of the End of Era of Domination and Transition to New World Order (Part VII)

On Mar 2, 2011

It is to be noted that the policy of “open economy” introduced by Anwar Sadat was totally abandoned the legacy of the July Revolution that upheld the overall wellbeing of the Egyptian people. The conscious sections of the Egyptian society who were ware of the dire consequences of the so-called policy of “open economy” opposed it as a betrayal of the popular cause, while many naïve citizens thought that such policy would provide impetus to economic development. However, contrary to the latter’s expectations the outcome was the opposite.

Part VII

Egypt: 30 years under emergency rule

When Sadat declared “open policy” in 1974, he was equally under pressure to pursue “open political line.” But it was not possible to translate it into practice. Besides, he was facing mounting domestic opposition and regional isolation in the wake of the signing of the Camp David accord. Although Sadat carried out extensive campaign to convince the Egyptian people that the agreement is for their ‘interest’, they totally rejected it as an act of surrender to Israel.

As the Camp David agreement infuriated not only the Egyptian population but also the entire Arab world, the Sadat government encountered major political isolation outside. Moreover, almost all the Arab countries severed diplomatic relations with Egypt. The country was also expelled from the Arab League in disgrace. The headquarters of the organization was also relocated from Cairo to Tunis City.

It thus became obvious that Sadat’s resort to “political openness” was not to his advantage taking into account the growing internal and external opposition. Although he allowed nominal political pluralism and freedom of expression, he was not at all willing to tolerate any opposition as regards the Camp David accord. Hence, it is not surprising to witness that he not only applied force but also prevented the exercise of basic human rights in a bid to suppress the mounting opposition. In September 1981, Anwar Sadat detained about 1500 intellectuals and politicians, in addition to declaring state of emergency under the pretext of controlling the activities of Islamic extremists. However, such resort to force failed to quell the popular opposition and bring about internal stability. On the contrary, this state of affairs created relatively conducive ground for extremists who previously did not have a say in the country’s politics. Thus, the latter managed to obtain ground for declaring war against the Egyptian government and carry out various operations.

Sadat’s subservience to the diktat of external forces exposed Egypt to deep political crisis and instability. As a result, on 6 October 1981 Sadat was assassinated by Islamic extremists while observing a military parade in connection with the ceremony marking Egypt’s victory over Israeli forces in the 1973 war. Unlike the deep popular mourning on the part of the Arab world in general and that of Egypt in particular which was witnessed following the death of Gamal Abdel Nasir, those who mourned Sadat’s death were not many.

President Housni Mubarak who became Egyptian leader after the assassination of Anwar Sadat applied the policy of “openness” on a bigger scale. Eearlier, Mubarak was an officer with significant role in the Egyptian Air Force. It is said that he played vital role in the 1973 war to which Sadat referred to as a military engagement that restored Egypt’s dignity. Because of that, Sadat appointed Mubarak as his Vice President. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasir and Anwar Sadat, Mubarak did not possess charismatic qualities and oratorical skill. This was apparent in the speech he delivered while assuming the Presidency and recently during his resignation after 30 years of rule, as many observers put it. In other respects too, he was not that firm and courageous in decision-making. In light of this, external forces keen to undermine Egypt’s political, economic and military capacity welcomed Housni Mubarak’s assumption of the Office of Presidency. The United States in particular announced that it would enhance military assistance to Egypt so that it may effectively combat terrorism. Mubarak on his part pledged to strive for the implementation of the policies pursued by Sadat.

President Mubarak soon embarked on taking the necessary measures to stabilize the internal situation in the country, in addition to further strengthening relations with the United States. The release of political prisoners detained in the days of Sadat rule was one of the steps he took. Nonetheless, Mubarak let the state of emergency declared by Sadat continue as before under the pretext of controlling the activities of extremist elements. It is to be noted that this declaration remained in force for 30 years until the recent stepping down of Housni Mubarak. Islamic extremists used to carry out continued attacks in the country in the mid 1990s. An assassination attempt was also made against President Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995.

Mubarak’s diplomatic stance was somewhat different from that of Anwar Sadat. Refraining from open contacts with Israel, he made seemingly anti-Israel statements, while at the same time wearing the mantle of pan-Arabism. Accordingly, he strived to normalize Egypt’s diplomatic ties with the Arab countries. Hence, many Arab countries restored diplomatic relations with Cairo in 1987. In the process, Egypt seized the opportunity of rejoining the Arab League, and subsequently the organization’s headquarters was moved from Tunis to its original location, i.e. Cairo.

Though Egypt rejoined the Arab League, its former dignity and influence could nonetheless not be restored. In actual fact, its influence was reduced to the lowest level over the past 30 years as a result of its stance regarding regional issues. The fact that it supported US invasion of Iraq both in 1990 and 2003, Israeli attack against Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, as well as its failure to strongly oppose Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia made it an impotent nation lacking an independent decision-making.

The deep hatred the Egyptian people harbored against their government which exposed the country to utter shame and disgrace is one of the decisive factors that prompted popular uprising and eventual overthrow of Housni Mubarak.

The forth coming article would focus on Egypt’s economic depression under Mubarak’s presidency.