A Decade Of Legitimate Resistance Vis-À-Vis The Rule Of The Jungle (Part VI)

Failures Associated with Unfettered Aggression

When the regime’s patrons felt that they have adequately equipped the TPLF regime and as a result it openly disclosed, in February1999, that it has comprehensively prepared to attack Eritrea, America undid the moratorium related to air attack that was signed between the two countries. This happened simply in order to provide the TPLF regime with a green light to launch a second round of aggression on Eritrea. However, what was judged by the military experts of the United Sates of America and their associates to be very sophisticated military plan was eventually proved not to be as fruitful as what they expected about it when it was on paper. The aggression was aborted within days by the gallant Eritrean youth who are ever committed for defending their homeland. When the officials in the American administration were shocked by the unexpected outcome of the aforesaid attack, in an attempt to enable it to regain enough time so as to prepare for a further offensive, they immediately forced the TPLF regime to accept the Frame Work Agreement and Modalities which was drafted by mediators and presented in the 35th session of the Organization of African Unity. In this case, while the TPLF regime explicitly accepted this mediation, the long term and covert plan was to undo this accord whenever it is appropriate like that of the moratorium. To covertly hinder the implementation of the agreement, the American government made its own representative part of the facilitators. Secretly, the American administration instructed the TPLF regime to adequately prepare itself for another and massive offensive. For this goal to be realized, the endeavors of the mediators had to be thwarted by such unconvincingly lame excuses as “We need further clarification concerning the accord. There are concerns that need to be further detailed,” and the like, which were presented by the TPLF regime.

In 1999, when America along with the EU was facilitating a peace talk, the American representative in the peace process presented what was called Technical Arrangements. This was considered to be a detailed and final document and was believed to facilitate the implementation of the Frame Work Agreement and Modalities that was adopted in 1999 during the 35th session of the Organization of African Unity. The American representative’s expectation was that Eritrea would refuse to accept his proposal or at least Eritrea would want to discuss some of the points incorporated in the document. With this in his mind, he threatened that the party (in his expectation it means Eritrea) that failed to accept this proposal would face serious consequences. More importantly, it was asserted that the document was not open for discussion. The way the document was prepared indicated that it was a take it or leave it document. America’s pretension was clearly disclosed when Eritrea accepted the said proposal. The reason is that the American administration never intended to resolve the case peacefully. Despite the fact that the American government publicly announced and threatened that the party rejecting the Technical Arrangements would face serious consequences, when the TPLF regime rejected it America did nothing to uphold what was strongly asserted in the proposal. To cover up their pretentious intentions, arms embargo that was equally applicable to the wrong doer and the wronged party (that is the one that accepted what was proposed and the one that rejected) was decided by way of the Security Council. And surprisingly, the American government unilaterally declared an arms embargo against Eritrea.

In May 2000, when the American administration felt that the TPLF regime was adequately prepared for a critically decisive third offensive against Eritrea, it was engaged in espionage to equip the TPLF with the required intelligence by putting aside the Technical Arrangements. As a result, America motivated and covertly endorsed TPLF’s third and more massive offensive, which was launched on May 12, 2000. Even then the TPLF’s aggression was steadfastly and effectively resisted by the Eritrean people and its defense forces. What was studied extensively and in a sophisticated manner, that is, the preparation that took a long time, was eventually proved to be futile to the contrary of what the American administration expected. The ultimate and covert goal of this aggression was to enable the TPLF forces to control Asmara so that they overthrow the Eritrean Government. However, the TPLF regime exhausted it energy as a consequence of the attack that was extended across all fronts of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border. At that time when the representatives of Eritrea and Ethiopia were in Algiers to discuss and sign a ceasefire, the American administration’s hope was that in the mean time Assab would be under the control of the TPLF forces and this would enable the TPLF regime to have an upper hand that would influence the outcome of the Algiers discussions. The peace talks were deliberately delayed for ten days hoping that the TPLF forces would control Assab after repeated attack in that front.

When the Eritrean defense forces were done with defending the aggression of the TPLF forces and were about to launch a counter attack against the exhaustively weakened TPLF forces, the American administration rushed to save the TPLF forces before the Eritrean forces would launch a counter attack that would be fatal for the TPLF forces. For this reason, it immediately instructed the regime to sign the Algiers peace agreement on June 18, 2000.

In all the three rounds of massive aggression against Eritrea, the substantial military assistance provided to the TPLF regime directly by America and through its representatives has been evidently documented. In addition to this, CIA did its best to politically (and opportunistically) destabilize Eritrea in May 2000 during the time when there was an escalated war. What the CIA attempted to internally destabilize Eritrea was aborted. Hence, the American administration failed in two fronts.