INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT ISAIAS AFWERKI: PART II – ON KEY REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES
(First Segment- conflict in Sudan)
- Mr. President, in the first part of our interview, you provided an insightful explanation of the global and regional situation. Our questions today primarily focus on domestic matters. Before delving into these issues, allow us to pose a question regarding Sudan. The Sudanese civil war remains unresolved, with many attributing its complexity to the involvement of foreign forces, particularly emerging regional powers like the UAE. The Sudanese government has also made similar accusations; and initiatives by neighboring countries have not progressed as anticipated. Why have regional initiatives failed? And how would you describe Eritrea’s relationship with the Sudanese forces?
PIA: The question you have raised is important. Indeed, it should have been addressed earlier. For purposes of clarity and on the basis of concrete evidence, first and foremost, there is no civil war in the Sudan or a war between the two generals, for that matter. Why would war erupt between two Generals; which segments of the Sudanese society does the purported civil war represent? For those intimately familiar with the situation, there is no civil war. What has actually unfolded is, in many respects, tantamount to an invasion. When the popular uprising erupted in the Sudan, the primary question was how it will pan out? For our part, we began, from the outset, to closely monitor developments, and seek ways of engaging positively with our Sudanese partners and brothers – a practice that was not new to us. We maintained similar contacts with our Sudanese counterparts even before the question of South Sudan was solved. We had since long developed the norms for regular consultations whenever new issues arose. When this current situation unfolded and although we had no foreknowledge or inkling about it, we promptly set out to appraise all its dimensions for proper interaction. In this spirit, and in order to consolidate the existing bilateral partnership, we prepared a ten-page concept paper that outlined our perspective on the unfolding events. We proceeded to discuss our perspectives, which may not have captured all the nuances of the event, with all the political entities who were active in the Sudan after the popular uprising. Our position remains still the same and the concept paper submitted then is available as a reference point.
For greater insight, it is crucial to revert to history and examine the political trajectory of Sudan since its independence in 1956. What were the country’s political configurations during the initial period, from Abboud to Nimeiry, and then after Nimeiry until the National Islamic Front (NIF), or “Jebhah Islamia,” seized power in 1989?
It must be recalled that the NIF came to power in 1989 having failed to influence policy during Numeri’s rule in spite of their efforts from within from 1983 onwards.
The NIF’s accession to power coincided with the end of the Cold War and Eritrea’s assertion of its Independence. Over the subsequent 30 years of NIF rule, and with the advent of the “Uni-polar order”, Sudan went through an anomalous political development. This was in stark contrast to Sudan’s political culture in the preceding periods, which was in fact more developed and advanced in comparative terms than the countries in the region and the rest in Africa.
It is important to clarify that the NIF did not genuinely represent Islam as a religious conviction; their agenda revolved around Political Islam. As mentioned, they had already infiltrated the Nimeiry government, steadily increasing their influence through the adoption of Sharia law. The movement has a long history, dating back to 1956, even further to 1927 within the broader Moslem Brotherhood movement. Throughout their roughly five-decades existence, their political influence on the Sudanese populace remained insignificant; never exceeding four percent. Their seizure of power through a coup was largely unpopular, in spite of their organizational capabilities, and they lacked broad popular acceptance across all parts of Sudan.
The most detrimental consequence of the NIF’s rule was the unhealthy developments that unfolded in South Sudan. The secession of South Sudan can largely be attributed to their instigation, as they began introducing divisive Arab/African and Christian/Islamic political narratives that had no basis in reality. Such politics were rejected even by the so-called “Islamic” segment of society, being seen as extreme and unacceptable. However, they pursued a fundamentalist agenda to reshape the entire region beyond Sudan. Until 1996, Osama bin Laden operated from eastern Sudan—a fact that profoundly illustrates their mindset and ambition. The emergence of Al-Qaeda created a dangerous source of instability. The origins of Al-Qaeda, its formation, and its entry into Sudan, is another complex story in itself. In brief, NIF’s conduct never genuinely represented the will of the Sudanese people.
As stressed earlier, one of the greatest historical disasters stemming from the NIF’s fundamentalist agenda was the secession of South Sudan in 2011. How did this separation come about? Looking back, the South Sudanese popular movement had no separatist agenda. John Garang famously argued that Sudan’s unity was 99 percent probable, with only a one percent chance of secession. The entire movement advocated for unity. Yet, the Islamists actively pushed for division. The current South Sudanese conflict between Riek Machar and Salva Kiir is a tragic continuation of this legacy. During the struggle, Machar, unlike figures such as John Garang, expressed a desire for secession. Ultimately, he returned to Khartoum, bringing talk of “peace from within,” which only destabilized the situation further. They began to inflame non-existent animosities between South Sudanese Nuer and Dinka tribes. Moreover, the impetus for South Sudan’s secession in 2011 was largely driven by the Islamist movement, with involvement from external forces as well.
Would this outcome have occurred if the NIF had not come to power? Prior to this situation, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), incorporating all the forces, had been established in Asmara. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) held regular meetings in Asmara to collaborate with other Sudanese political forces. The direction was promising, but the Islamists thwarted all these efforts. The problem could not be resolved by the secession of the South; the issue of Abyei was postponed, and the crises in Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile also continued unresolved. The agenda they boasted about, “Temkin al-Musteda’fin” (empowering the weak), was neither fair nor just. The economic damage and looting they caused were immense.
As a result of these accumulated problems, a popular uprising erupted in 2019. It was spontaneous, and was not led by any specific political entity; organization or political movement. The people were grappling with enormous and spiraling hardships, the economic crises were endless, and these drove them to the streets. Sudan is a rich country; it was once known as the “breadbasket” of the region. However, and in spite of its natural endowments, its people became afflicted with hunger and poverty. Economic devastation stemming from resource plunder and corruption, coupled with political instability, ultimately compelled the people to rise up and overthrow the NIF regime.
Against this backdrop, the central question was what will happen next? This required a well-thought out roadmap. In this spirt, we embarked on preparing concept papers that would facilitate and become a basis for the consultations that were envisaged. The fact is the crises inculcated by the NIF was not entirely confined to the Sudan. It also entailed severe ramifications to the whole region. As such, we chose to become actively engaged rather than observe developments passively from the sidelines. And, to act effectively, we needed to define our engagement strategy.
The next phase consisted of fulfilling the needs and aspirations of the Sudanese people. One can draw appropriate lessons from the tribulations of the past to chart-out a proper plan of transition that ultimately leads to a new, cogent, environment. The transition would in effect fulfill the requisite tasks and serve as a bridge to “the gate of safety”. In more explicit terms, these tasks consist of the establishment of a citizenship-based system that genuinely represents the will of the people without racial, religious and other divisions. It would build its own sovereign institutions; rectify the damage caused by the NIF; and create the conditions for Sudan to move forward.
Once these desired objectives are achieved, those currently in charge of the transitional stage would hand over the lever of power to the people. Because, they are merely custodians of the legacy entrusted to them in the aftermath of the popular uprising. Otherwise, they have no other mandate. The people can then pursue the nation-building path they cherish.
How long would this transition take? Perhaps two or three years. Looking back, three years have already elapsed since our paper was submitted in 2022. It could have been accomplished with broad public participation within that timeframe; without significant hurdles.
What we are witnessing now—the so-called “war of two generals”—has been deliberately engineered to disrupt this process. The situation is being complicated, managed as a “crisis management” scenario. If we ask why this came about, Sudan became a victim due to its geopolitical significance. The problems we are seeing are primarily caused by external forces. Those operating internally, speaking against the army, against General Burhan, against specific tribes, are paid agents. They have no specific goals, which they are supposed to achieve.
We have shared these ideas with all the parties, not just one side, because it’s not a unilateral issue. After the massive uprising, the direction was clear, and there was no one else by default, besides the army, to shoulder the responsibility.
Who was spearheading the popular uprising? “Huriya Wateqiyer” (Freedom and Change) – where did it come from? How did the old parties fare? The army had to shoulder the responsibility with which it was entrusted because otherwise, the vacuum could lead to unnecessary squabbling and derail the whole process. The question was not whether the army is good or bad, strong or weak. Our view was that there was no other option; so the army should shoulder the burden of transition, whose duration would not be long. But this could not materialize. Our views reflected the goodwill and aspirations we held in good-faith. Given Sudan’s geopolitical importance, unnecessary external interference has taken the matter out of the hands of the Sudanese.
People often point fingers at the UAE, claiming they are behind all these mayhem. This is not a matter that needs proof. One can invoke not only what is happening in Libya but also what is being done through Chad, the Central African Republic, and through Kordofan. And what about (the weapons supply) from the Ethiopian side? What has been unfolding is not something ambiguous or blurred. But the big question arises: Why the UAE? This is particularly worrying for us now. Why would the UAE do this? One cannot comprehend it. Others might be able to interpret their motives; I cannot.
I first met Sheikh Zayed in 1972, 53 years ago; when the UAE was first established. Our relationship goes back to that period. He was an honorable man; a truly great Statesman. When people speak about what the UAE is doing these days, I remember Sheikh Zayed. My last meeting with him was probably in Geneva in 1996. Endless stories can be told about Sheikh Zayed, about the great things he did for the UAE. For a country founded by such a noble man to be embroiled in such acts: Why? Ascertaining the full facts on UAE’s involvement; where the weapons and drones are coming from; the source of disinformation that is misleading others in the region, is another topic. But it remains unacceptable by all standards. The intervention in Libya is another story. The interference in Chad is endless. Even the situation in Ethiopia is not of the making of the Ethiopian Federal Government or the Prosperity Party.
If someone or one Government is contemplating controlling the Suez Canal and building a major port there; controlling Jeddah, Port Sudan, Hodeidah, Djibouti, Assab, Aden, Berbera, Mogadishu, Mombasa, Lamu, and reaching as far as Dar es Salaam; setting up a base in Berbera to control the Gulf of Aden… how can one find a rational explanation for this ambition? How can one explain this elusive dream of creating a great empire of ports?
Influence peddling is obviously an integral part of this scheme. Billions of dollars are spent on issues like “climate change” to fund political parties here and there. There is no end to the billions that governments in this region receive from the UAE. Similarly, many programs are launched to promote different agendas. They claim to “develop ports” but are these no-man’s land? Are there no governments? Are there no people there who wish to develop their own investments, industries, and infrastructure? The intervention in Sudan is not different from such elusive dream. The interventions in Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and South Sudan are all driven by this overarching purpose. The agendas in the Red Sea are endless. The complications that transpired in Yemen recently are numerous.
Finally, I would say that all these missteps do not truly represent, in any conceivable way, the UAE. The UAE is acting as an agent of others. This is extremely worrying; especially what is happening in Sudan.
The drones that have recently been landing in Addis Ababa, Debre Zeyit, and Bahir Dar—where did they come from? Who is bringing them? The weapons that are being unloaded daily from huge transport planes are not hidden. What is the purpose?
What is happening in Yemen is another a topic in itself. The pattern is the same in Libya and Chad. There are forces behind all these schemes; forces that have been active for a long time. They have ramped up these acts recently; especially with the return of President Trump to the White House. The ultimate aim seems to create a conducive environment for Israeli control in the region. Indeed, as alluded to in our discussion the other day, the Federal Ethiopian Government is claiming that their main supporters (in their quest for sovereign sea access) are: Israel First; UAE Second; France third, and US as fourth.
What are the interests of these forces? What do they want to achieve in the Gulf of Aden? Why are they singling out and propagating the Somaliland issue? What is the purpose of the interventions in Somalia? Where could the situation in Yemen be headed? How does it relate to the broader regional situation? Why are these so-called Red Sea ports—Hodeidah, Assab, Port Sudan, Jeddah, Suez—being targeted? What real benefit does the UAE derive from this? What does the UAE want to do there?
These are many issues that can be discussed on another occasion. Overall, however, the situation in Sudan is should be understood within this broader context. Why was the solution, which should have come easily, delayed? Why is it becoming complicated again? The answer lies in the broader context that I have raised before.
There are also UN and other interventions. Why is the UN getting involved in unnecessary matters? Why was food shortage in Sudan highlighted more than others? In any UN descriptions, the problems in Sudan are described in generic terms without delving into its complex dimensions. There are many interventions, supposedly for reconciliation but which only exacerbate the problem. Who are being reconciled? What is the reconciliation for? What is its purpose? Is it merely a two-person problem, and is the goal to solve only that? Is there truly a plan for reconciliation? Many questions can be asked.
But to revert to what I said earlier: the Sudanese problem is one of the geopolitical problems of the region. It is not separate from the broader regional issues, although Sudan is being targeted first. Many forces are being targeted in this area. As such, we must all contribute because we cannot remain passive. Contribution, however, must start from a proper understanding and solid assessment of the situation. It must also be consensual. These are the fundamental parameters that guide our action.
It must be emphasized that the stability of Sudan has a major impact not only in this region, but also beyond in terms of the broader geopolitical issues I have discussed earlier. So contributing to the solution of the prevailing problem is a necessity, not an optional choice. Everyone must act on it. To remain silent while such a danger looms, becomes more complicated, and deteriorates further is not a choice that we contemplate. So, we need to understand the issues of Sudan in greater depth. We need to monitor developments closely: the delivery of weapons from Dubai or Abu Dhabi to various destinations in the region etc. and related movements. We should not remain silent while witnessing all these transgressions. Everyone should join hands in solving Sudan’s problem.